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YOU CAN’T TEACH AN OLD DOG NEW TRICKS:




In Montana, while the Highway Patrol’s stated mission is “safeguard-
ing the lives, property, and constitutional rights of people traveling the ways
of our State,”1 every day, officers initiate traffic stops which place them in a
position to infringe the very constitutional rights they purport to uphold.
Granted, people put their health, safety, and welfare at risk by driving on
our nation’s highways, and highway patrol officers are charged with pro-
tecting those drivers by enforcing civil and criminal laws, providing emer-
gency response, and educating the community.2 However, both the United
States and Montana Constitutions protect against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and these protections impose limitations on the permissible scope
of police conduct.3
State v. Wilson4 illustrates a failed attempt to safeguard the constitu-
tional rights of the people during the attempted enforcement of criminal
law. There, a highway patrol officer pulled a vehicle over for expired regis-
tration before impermissibly expanding the traffic stop into a drug investi-
gation involving the use of a drug-detection canine5 that, according to the
Montana Supreme Court, violated Johnathan Wilson’s constitutional right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
* Student, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, J.D. candidate
2021. Thank you to my wife Audrey for recognizing my strengths when I struggle to see them. Thank
you to my parents and family for supporting me over the years, especially through the challenging times
that have graced me with a unique perspective to comment on the matters discussed in this paper. Thank
you to the Montana Law Review, specifically Co-Editor-in-Chief, Riley Wavra, for the informative
feedback and Faculty Advisor, Professor Anthony Johnstone, for the guidance and insight during the
writing process.
1. Montana Dep’t of Justice, About MHP- Mission and Values, MONTANA HIGHWAY PATROL (last
visited Jan. 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/9KX9-3XS5.
2. Montana Dep’t of Justice, Recruitment: Duties of a Patrol Trooper, MONTANA HIGHWAY PA-
TROL (last visited Jan. 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/Q2C4-YGGC.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11.
4. 430 P.3d 77 (Mont. 2018).
5. This comment uses the term “drug-detection canine” to refer to a canine trained to detect illicit
drugs. Courts and commentators have used other terms interchangeably including drug sniffing dog,
drug detection dog, canine unit, K-9, and canine. The term drug detection canine is defined such that it
excludes canines trained for rescue purposes and canines trained to detect explosives.
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This comment first discusses the current scope of the federal and state
constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
before analyzing the Montana Supreme Court’s holding in Wilson. This
comment takes a prospective look at the use of drug-detection canines in a
nation with ever evolving marijuana policies. Specifically, Section II dis-
cusses the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures as applied to use of drug-detection canines. Section III relays the
facts and procedure of Wilson, followed by a summary of the holding and
dissent.
The substantive analysis of Wilson rests in Section IV, where this com-
ment agrees with the Montana Supreme Court’s holding that the officer
lacked the particularized suspicion necessary to deploy a drug-detection ca-
nine, but argues that in light of Montana’s Medical Marijuana Act, the de-
fense should have questioned the continued validity of the particularized
suspicion standard as applied to the use of drug-detection canines. Ulti-
mately, this comment suggests that the Montana Supreme Court should re-
quire an officer to show probable cause, prior to initiating the use of a drug-
detection canine for the purposes of uncovering marijuana. In the alterna-
tive, this comment suggests that an officer be required to demonstrate fac-
tual support that the individual or place to be searched contains drugs in
violation of state law. Finally, this comment suggests that the Montana
Highway Patrol, instead of relying on judicial action, could refrain from
using drug-detection canines trained to detect marijuana.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FROM UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The framers of the United States Constitution enumerated the people’s
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth
Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.6
The Montana Constitution’s provision against unreasonable searches
and seizures utilizes nearly identical language as the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.7 However, the Montana Supreme Court has
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11 (“The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and
effects from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place, or seize any person or
thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized, or
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing”).
2
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consistently held that certain searches which are reasonable under the
United States Constitution may nevertheless be unreasonable under the
Montana Constitution.8 That is, the Montana Constitution provides greater
protections against unreasonable searches than the United States Constitu-
tion.9 The Montana Supreme Court relies on two distinct rationales for af-
fording greater protections against government searches than the United
States Constitution: (1) Montana’s constitution, unlike the United States
Constitution, enumerates an individual right of privacy;10 and (2) Mon-
tana’s constitution is a source of authority distinct from the United States
Constitution.11
Specifically, the Montana Constitution provides: “the right of individ-
ual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be
infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”12 While de-
bating the adoption of this provision, Constitutional Convention Delegate
Thomas Ask suggested that the right of privacy must yield to the state’s
compelling interest in conducting reasonable searches and seizures.13 Yet,
Delegate Bob Campbell indicated that the right of privacy strengthens the
8. See e.g. State v. Sawyer, 571 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Mont. 1977); see also State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d
61, 75 (Mont. 1995); State v. Tackitt, 67 P.3d 295, 300 (Mont. 2003). However, with regards to unrea-
sonable seizures, the Montana Constitution generally provides the same amount of protection as the
United States Constitution. See e.g. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-403 (a traffic stop may last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop); c.f. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614
(2015) (“[b]ecause addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate that purpose”) (internal punctuation omitted).
9. At one point the Montana Supreme Court went so far as to hold that the right of privacy and the
search and seizure provisions extended to infringements by not only law enforcement officers, but pri-
vate individuals as well. State v. Helfrich, 600 P.2d 816, 817–19 (Mont. 1979) (holding the defendant’s
neighbor’s conduct of collecting a sample of marijuana while trespassing upon defendant’s property
violated the defendant’s right of privacy and right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures)
(overruled by State v. Long, 700 P.2d 153, 157 (Mont. 1985) (holding privacy protection only extends to
infringements by the State)).
10. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; see also Bullock, 901 P.2d at 75.
11. Bullock, 901 P.2d at 75 (“states are free to grant citizens greater protections based on state
constitutional provisions than the United States Supreme Court divines from the United States Constitu-
tion”).
12. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
13. 6 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT 1852–53 (1979) [hereinafter CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT] (because the people have a right to be free only those searches and
seizures that are unreasonable, the state has a compelling interest to conduct reasonable searches and
seizures).
3
Yould: Changing Marijuana Law
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2020
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON106.txt unknown Seq: 4 31-MAR-20 9:42
134 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 81
protections against searches and seizures.14 The Montana Supreme Court
has had to balance these competing concerns.15
The Montana Supreme Court, relying on both the right of privacy and
distinct authority of Montana’s Constitution, has provided greater individ-
ual protections by limiting the state’s power to electronically record indi-
viduals’ conversations,16 to intrude on an individual’s property,17 to search
automobiles,18 and to use drug-detection canines.19 Below, this Comment
discusses the use of drug-detection canines in both the state and federal
context, before discussing the development of the particularized suspicion
standard.
14. Id. at 1681 (at the time the Bill of Rights was amended to the United States Constitution “the
search and seizure provisions were enough,” but by the time Montana revised its constitution in 1972 the
prevalence of “wiretaps, electronic and bugging devices, photo surveillance equipment and computer-
ized data banks” placed Montanan’s at greater risk of privacy invasion and justified strengthening pro-
tections against search and seizures by expressing the right of privacy).
15. State v. Wood, 666 P.2d 753, 754 (Mont. 1983) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (“the
right of individual privacy must yield to a compelling state interest. Such compelling state interest exists
where the state enforces its criminal laws for the benefit and protection of other fundamental rights of
citizens”); see also State v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 441, 449 (Mont. 1997) (the right of individual privacy
must yield to compelling state interest in conducting reasonable searches and seizures based on probable
cause); but see Bullock, 901 P.2d at 75 (unlike under federal precedent, in Montana, officers may not
search the open-fields of a person’s property because Montana’s expressed individual right of privacy
“grants rights beyond that inferred from the United States Constitution”).
16. State v. Solis, 693 P.2d 518, 523 (Mont. 1984) (the State’s warrantless recording of defendant’s
conversations with an undercover agent violated the defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable
searches); c.f. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 750–52 (1979) (holding the government’s record-
ing of defendant’s conversations without Justice Department approval did not violate any constitutional
protections).
17. Bullock, 901 P.2d at 75–76 (interpreting Montana’s right of privacy as granting greater protec-
tions than those afforded under the United States Constitution with respect to government intrusion upon
the open fields surrounding private property); c.f. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984)
(“government intrusion upon open fields is not one of those ‘unreasonable searches’ proscribed by the
text of the 4th amendment”).
18. State v. Sawyer, 571 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Mont. 1977) (“non-investigative inventory searches of
automobiles without warrants must be restricted to safeguarding those articles which are within plain
view of the officers vision”); c.f. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375–76 (1976) (a non-
investigative inventory search of automobile without a warrant which went beyond articles in plain view
was reasonable under Fourth Amendment); see also State v. Elison, 14 P.3d 456, 468–71 (Mont. 2000)
(holding no automobile-exception exists in Montana and requiring probable cause and presence of some
other well-established exception, such as plain-view, search incident to arrest, or exigent circumstances);
c.f. Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (2018) (under federal law the search of an automobile
does not need a warrant if an officer: (1) has lawfully stopped a vehicle; and (2) has probable cause to
believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149
(1925).
19. State v. Tackitt, 67 P.3d 295, 300–01 (Mont. 2003).
4
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A. Use of Drug-detection Canines: Federal Case Law
The Fourth Amendment only applies when the government conducts
searches or seizures.20 Therefore, much police work falls outside the reach
of this constitutional protection. The initial question of constitutional analy-
sis is whether the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
extends to the circumstances at issue. Specifically, did the police conduct a
“search?” Did the police conduct a “seizure?” If the answers to both these
questions are no, then Fourth Amendment protections are not implicated. If
the answer to either of these questions is yes, then a court must determine,
based on the facts and circumstances, whether the search or seizure at issue
was unreasonable.
1. Seizures in Order to Allow a Drug-Detection Canine to Sniff
Government conduct constitutes a seizure if it either interferes with a
person’s possessory interest in property,21 or restricts a person’s freedom of
motion such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.22
For example, if an officer, in order to allow a drug-detection canine to
sniff the exterior of an individual’s luggage, takes control of the luggage,
such that the individual does not retain possession of the luggage, the of-
ficer has effectuated a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.23 Alternatively, when an officer stops an individual driving a vehicle,
even for a simple traffic violation, such that a reasonable person in that
situation would not feel free to leave, the officer has seized that individ-
ual.24 Once a court determines a seizure occurred, the next analytic step is
determining whether that seizure was reasonable.
Regardless of whether the officer seized the individual person or the
individual’s property, a critical limitation on seizures remains—duration.25
In United States v. Place, the United States Supreme Court held as unrea-
sonable a seizure in which the officers detained the individual’s luggage for
ninety minutes and transported it to another airport in order to allow a drug-
detection canine to sniff the exterior of the luggage.26 Similarly, in Rodri-
guez v. United States, an officer stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation,
20. Tracy Maclin, The Fourth Amendment on the Freeway, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 117, 131
(2001).
21. Soldal v. Cook Cty, 506 U.S. 56, 63 (1992) (seizure of property occurs “where there is some
meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property”).
22. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n.16 (1968).
23. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708 (1983).
24. Maclin, supra note 20, at 144–45; see e.g. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1613
(2015) (finding Rodriguez was not “free to leave”).
25. Place, 462 U.S. at 709.
26. Id. at 699, 709–10.
5
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issued a traffic citation, then, without first identifying any objective indica-
tions of criminal activity, prolonged the stop to allow a drug-detection ca-
nine to sniff the exterior of the vehicle.27 Because the officer’s use of the
drug-detection canine prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time reasonably
required to complete the stop’s purpose, the United States Supreme Court
held the seizure to be unreasonable.28 While other factors, such as an of-
ficer’s failure to inform the individual of how long the property will be
seized and where it will be taken, make it more likely that the seizure is
unreasonable, a lengthy duration of a seizure is sufficient for a court to hold
a seizure to be unreasonable.29
2. When Does the Government’s Use of Drug-Detection Canines
Constitute a Search?
Government conduct constitutes a search if the government either: (1)
physically trespasses on an individual’s person, papers, or effects;30 or (2)
intrudes on an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.31 The first
category will be referred to as physical searches while the latter will be
referred to as informational searches. Physical searches, historically, were
the only searches the Fourth Amendment protected against,32 while infor-
mational searches later gained constitutional protections in response to pub-
lic concern33 of the government’s increased use of wiretaps and other non-
physically intrusive investigation techniques.34 While the United States Su-
preme Court has expanded Fourth Amendment protections beyond physical
searches to include informational searches such as wire taps and thermal
imaging, it has yet to extend those protections to non-physically invasive
use of drug-detection canines.
Under the United States Constitution, government use of drug-detec-
tion canines only constitutes a search if the officer or drug-detection canine
27. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612–13.
28. Id. at 1616—17; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 799 F.3d 1222 (8th Cir. 2015) (on remand
the 8th Circuit held that, under precedent at the time of the stop, the officer’s seizure was reasonable).
29. Place, 462 U.S. at 710.
30. See e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013).
31. See e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–35 (2001).
32. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding that wiretaps did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because, “[t]here was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured
by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the
defendants”); see also Richard C. Tallman & Tania M. Culbertson, 2019 James R. Browning Distin-
guished Lecture in Law, “Holding the Delicate Balance Steady and True”: The History of FISA’s Grand
Bargain, 80 MONT. L. REV. 137, 140 (2019) (an informational search such as “wiretapping simply was
not the kind of search against which the Fourth Amendment protect[ed]”).
33. Or perhaps the concern of nine unelected Justices. See supra Tallman note 32, at 141 (“it is the
responsibility of the legislative branch to adjust the balance when it comes to privacy issues”).
34. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33—35.
6
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physically intrudes on a person’s property.35 If the officer or drug-detection
canine does not physically intrude on a person’s property, and the officer
has not unreasonably seized the individual or the individual’s property,36
then the officer’s use of a drug-detection canine does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.37
Comparing the physical search present in Florida v. Jardines with the
informational search present in United States v. Place illuminates the differ-
ence between government use of drug-detection canines which physically
intrudes upon a person’s property and the less invasive use of drug-detec-
tion canines to sniff the exterior of a person’s property. In Jardines, the
United States Supreme Court determined the officers’ use of a drug-detec-
tion canine constituted a search because the officers, along with their drug-
detection canine, physically trespassed on Jardines’ porch to detect odors.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that, “[o]ne virtue of the
Fourth Amendment property-rights base-line is that it keeps easy cases
easy. That the officers learned what they learned only by physically intrud-
ing on Jardines’ property to gather evidence is enough to establish that a
search occurred.”38
Whereas in United States v. Place, the drug-detection canine did not
physically trespass into the traveler’s luggage. There, because the drug-de-
tection canine merely sniffed the exterior of the traveler’s luggage and be-
cause the drug-detection canine was able to distinguish the scent of narcot-
ics from the scent of clothing and other non-contraband items, the Court
concluded the use of the drug-detection canine did not constitute a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.39 The United States Su-
preme Court, in Place, reasoned that since the drug-detection canine which
sniffed the exterior of luggage, “disclose[d] only the presence or absence of
narcotics, a contraband item,” it did not intrude the traveler’s reasonable
expectation of privacy40 and, therefore, did not constitute a search.41
35. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11–12.
36. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616–17 (2015).
37. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983) (under the expectation of privacy analysis
of informational searches, government use of a drug-detection canine does not constitute a “search”).
38. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11–12.
39. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
40. A search occurs if an officer infringes on a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (because Katz had an “actual, subjec-
tive expectation of privacy” in the conversation, and “society [was] prepared to recognize [that expecta-
tion of privacy] as reasonable,” the Fourth Amendment protected Katz from government intrusion of his
private conversation).
41. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
7
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While the accuracy of drug-detection canines in detecting contraband
has been challenged,42 the United States Supreme Court has yet to abrogate
Place’s rule that the government’s non-physically intrusive use of a drug-
detection canine does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.43 The follow-
ing section analyzes the different approach to drug-detection canines
adopted by the Montana Supreme Court.
B. Use of Drug-detection Canines: Montana Case Law
Regarding unreasonable seizures, Montana’s Constitution generally af-
fords the same amount of protection as the United States Constitution.44
However, regarding unreasonable searches, the Montana Supreme Court,
relying on both the express right of individual privacy and the distinct au-
thority of the Montana Constitution, affords greater protections than the
United States Constitution—at least with respect to government use of
drug-detection canines.45
Unlike at the federal level, under Montana law, government use of a
drug-detection canine constitutes a search whether or not there is a physical
intrusion upon a person’s property,46 including when a drug-detection ca-
nine sniffs the exterior of container in which an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.47 Under the Montana Constitution, when an officer
42. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411–12 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Katz &
Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending the Protection of the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug
Dogs, 85 NEB. L. REV. 735, 755–57 (2007).
43. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10; but see Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2013) (holding
officers physically intruding on porch with drug-detection canines constitutes a search); see also State v.
Tackitt, 69 P.3d 295, 300–01 (Mont. 2003) (use of a drug-detection canine constitutes a search); People
v. McKnight, 446 P.3d 397, 400 (Colo. 2019) (use of a drug-detection canine constitutes a search).
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-403 (a traffic stop may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop); c.f. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (“[b]ecause
addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate
that purpose”) (internal punctuation omitted); but see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); Hulse v.
Department of Justice, 961 P.2d 75, 86–87 (Mont. 1997) (once stopped, if the officer’s initial suspicion
of wrongdoing has not been dispelled and the officer fears for his or her safety, or the safety of others,
the officer may conduct a limited search).
45. Tackitt, 67 P.3d at 300–01 (“the use of the canine sniff of Tackitt’s vehicle was a search under
Article II, Sections 10 and 11”); see e.g. Scott v. Billings Police Dep’t., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218805
(D. Mont. 2018) (under Montana law the use of a drug-detection canine was unreasonable, but under the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution the use of the drug-detection canine was reasona-
ble).
46. See Tackitt, 67 P.3d at 301 (use of a drug-detection canine on a residence generally requires
probable cause and a warrant because it is a search).
47. Id. at 300–01 (“the use of the canine sniff of Tackitt’s vehicle was a search under Article II,
Sections 10 and 11”); see also Id. at 302–03 (“when a person maintains control of a container in which
he has a reasonable expectation of privacy, but where the odors from that container are freely exposed to
the public, particularized suspicion is required for the use of a canine to detect those odors”); c.f. State v.
Scheetz, 950 P.2d 722, 727 (Mont. 1997) (“a person lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
smell of luggage that he or she brings to an airport”).
8
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or drug-detection canine physically intrudes upon a person’s property, the
officer generally needs probable cause and a warrant before allowing the
drug-detection canine to sniff within the person’s property.48 However,
when a drug-detection canine sniffs the exterior of a vehicle, luggage, or
other container, the officer needs only particularized suspicion of criminal
activity.49
The Montana Supreme Court, by recognizing that government use of a
drug-detection canine constitutes a search, affords greater protections
against government use of drug-detection canines than the United States
Supreme Court. However, it reduces the necessary factual support from
probable cause to particularized suspicion based upon the same rationale
the United States Supreme Court utilized to exclude drug-detecting canines
from the scope of the Fourth Amendment.50 In short, the Montana Supreme
Court, by applying the particularized suspicion standard to the use of drug-
detection canines has concluded that such police conduct should be subject
to less constitutional scrutiny because it is less intrusive than other types of
investigative techniques and is “uniquely selective,” disclosing only the
presence or absence of contraband.51 The origins and contemporary form of
the particularized suspicion concept are discussed below.
C. Particularized Suspicion — Origins of the Standard
Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable,
save for a few well-defined exceptions.52 By requiring a warrant, courts
reduce error in law enforcement’s application of constitutional principles
because a neutral third party determines if the officer has sufficient factual
evidence of criminal activity to conduct the search or seizure.53 Conversely,
obtaining a warrant for all searches and seizures inhibits government’s abil-
ity to aptly uncover criminal wrongdoing. However, certain exceptions to
the warrant requirement54 expand law enforcement’s scope of permissible
48. Tackitt, 67 P.3d at 301 (unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies); c.f. Florida v.
Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 12 (2013) (“probable cause, not reasonable suspicion, is the proper evidentiary
showing of wrongdoing that the government must make prior to conducting a dog ‘sniff test’ at a private
residence”).
49. Tackitt, 67 P.3d at 302–03.
50. Tackitt, 67 P.3d at 302; c.f. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
51. Tackitt, 67 P.3d at 302; Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
52. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967); see also State v. Elison, 14 P.3d 456, 467 (Mont. 2000).
53. Oren Bar-Gill and Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1614
(2010). See also Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1,
10–12 (1992).
54. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736 (1983) (plain view exception for seizures); c.f. State v. Loh,
914 P.2d 592, 597–600 (1996) (plain view exception for seizures); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 235 (1973) (search incident to arrest); State v. Cooney, 149 P.3d 554, 556 (Mont. 2006) (applying
9
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conduct by reducing constitutional scrutiny of police conduct. Generally,
these exceptions permit an officer to search or seize individuals or their
property, without a warrant, based merely upon particularized suspicion of
criminal activity.
The particularized suspicion standard originates from Terry v. Ohio,
the seminal case establishing the investigatory stop and frisk. Terry holds
“in justifying the particular [physical] intrusion the police officer must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that [physical] in-
trusion.”55
Terry reasoned that the government’s interest in officer safety out-
weighed constitutional protections when holding that officers may conduct
investigative stop and frisks based upon mere particularized suspicion.
Over a decade later, United States v. Cortez56 refined the particularized
suspicion standard and applied it to investigative stops of automobiles.
Aligning with Terry’s balancing test to determine reasonableness, Cortez
reasoned that the government’s interest in “halting illegal entry into this
country” outweighed the individual’s constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches.57 The balancing of government interests against the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was
similarly used by the Montana Supreme Court when it adopted and later
expanded the particularized suspicion standard.
1. The Particularized Suspicion Standard Enters Montana Law
Shortly after the United States Supreme Court decided Cortez, Mon-
tana adopted the particularized suspicion standard for vehicular stops. In
State v. Gopher,58 the Montana Supreme Court held that “when a trained
police officer has particularized suspicion that the occupant of a vehicle is
or has been engaged in criminal activity, or witness thereto, a limited and
reasonable investigatory stop and search is justified.”59 In Gopher, the po-
lice officer, while responding to a call that somebody broke a rifle store
window, noticed a singular vehicle drive very slowly past the crime scene
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–5–102, the codified search-incident-to-arrest exception); Kentucky v. King,
563 U.S. 452, 462 (2011) (exigent circumstances exception); c.f. State v. Wakeford, 953 P.2d 1065,
1068 (Mont. 1998) (exigent circumstances exception); Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (2018)
(automobile exception); c.f. Elison, 14 P.3d at 468–71 (automobile exception does not apply in Mon-
tana, instead an officer must have probable cause and another exception to the warrant requirement such
as plain view, search incident to arrest, or exigent circumstances).
55. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
56. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
57. 449 U.S. at 418–19.
58. 631 P.2d 293 (Mont. 1981).
59. Id. at 296.
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and express an inordinate amount of interest in the scene. The officer, based
on his experience, deduced from these facts that the occupants of the vehi-
cle were either involved with or witnessed the crime.60 The Court held that
the “objective data” from which the “experienced officer” made “certain
inferences,” coupled with the “resulting suspicion that the occupant of [the]
certain vehicle [was] engaged in wrongdoing or was witness to criminal
activity” justified the officer in pulling the vehicle over.61 The Montana
Legislature codified this standard in Montana Code Annotated § 46–5–401,
which states an “officer may stop any person or vehicle that is observed in
circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the person or occu-
pant of the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
offense.”62
Terry, Cortez, and Gopher all reduce constitutional scrutiny of law
enforcement conduct with respect to physical seizures of individuals, and in
each, the courts held that the officers had sufficient particularized suspicion
of criminal activity to justify the stops. The Montana Supreme Court has
continued this reduction of constitutional scrutiny of law enforcement con-
duct, by applying the particularized suspicion standard to the more ephem-
eral “searches” including field sobriety tests63 and the use of drug-detection
canines.64
2. Montana Expands the Particularized Suspicion Standard to Non-
physical, Informational Intrusions of Privacy
As discussed above, every time an officer pulls a vehicle over, the
officer has physically seized the individual occupants of the vehicle. In or-
der to prevent a violation of the individuals’ constitutional rights, the officer
must have particularized suspicion that at least one of the occupants is en-
gaged in, was engaged in, or witness to wrongdoing.65 Once stopped, how-
ever, if the officer’s initial suspicion of wrongdoing has not been dispelled
and the officer fears for his or her safety, or the safety of others, the officer
may conduct a limited search.66 The Montana Supreme Court, following the
rationale of Terry, later expanded the scope of permissible conduct during
an investigative traffic stop to include administration of field sobriety tests.
In Hulse v. Department of Justice,67 the Montana Supreme Court first cate-
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–5–401.
63. Hulse v. Department of Justice, 961 P.2d 75, 86–87 (Mont. 1997).
64. State v. Tackitt, 67 P.3d 295, 301–02 (Mont. 2003).
65. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981); State v. Gopher, 631 P.2d 293, 296
(Mont. 1981).
66. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
67. 961 P.2d 75 (Mont. 1997).
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gorized the field sobriety test as a search, then it established the evidentiary
standard an officer must satisfy prior to conducting a field sobriety test.68
The Court in Hulse held that an officer must have particularized suspi-
cion of a driver’s intoxication in order to reasonably conduct a field sobri-
ety test.69 Applying the same balancing approach as Terry, where the
United States Supreme Court reasoned that officer safety outweighed the
constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Montana Supreme Court reasoned that the governmental interest in protect-
ing the public from the dangers of drunk drivers outweighed the limited
intrusion of an individual’s privacy stemming from a field sobriety test.70
Similarly, in State v. Tackitt, the Montana Supreme Court expanded
the application of the particularized suspicion standard to another non-phys-
ically intrusive search—government use of drug-detection canines to sniff
the exterior of a closed container. Tackitt recognizes the government’s use
of a drug-detection canines as a search71 and holds that an officer must have
particularized suspicion of criminal activity prior to using a drug-detection
canine to sniff the exterior of a vehicle.72
In Tackitt, the Montana Supreme Court took pains to establish that an
officer only needs particularized suspicion of an individual’s criminal drug
activity prior to commencing use of a drug-detection canine. Following the
approach of Terry and Hulse, where the particularized suspicion standard
properly determined that the respective government interests of officer and
public highway safety outweighed the minimal intrusion of privacy during
stop and frisk investigations and sobriety tests, in Tackitt, the Montana Su-
preme Court reasoned that the particularized suspicion standard best bal-
anced the government interest in “discouraging illegal drug trafficking”
against the minimal intrusion of privacy from the exploratory sniff of a
drug-detection canine.73 Tackitt stands for the proposition that “when a per-
son maintains control of a container in which he has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, but where the odors from that container are freely exposed
to the public, particularized suspicion is required for the use of a canine to
detect those odors.”74 Tackitt’s holding, therefore, permits an officer, sup-
ported by particularized suspicion, to use a drug-detection canine not only
68. Id. at 84–85 (because of the reasonable expectation of privacy in the information disclosed such
as literacy of the individual, and whether the individual suffers from diseases that affect memory or
physical capabilities).
69. Id. at 87.
70. Id. 86–87.
71. State v. Tackitt, 67 P.3d 295, 300–01 (Mont. 2003).
72. Id. at 304.
73. Id. at 302.
74. Id. at 302–03.
12
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on a parked, unattended vehicle, but also when using a drug-detection ca-
nine during a routine traffic stop.75
While Tackitt posits a broad rule allowing the Montana government to
use drug-detection canines if an officer has mere particularized suspicion of
criminal activity, it does so based on the presumption that use of drug-
detection canines is less intrusive than other investigative techniques and is
uniquely selective in detecting contraband.76 However, as discussed further
in Section V, after the passage of Montana’s Medical Marijuana Act, pos-
session of marijuana by registered medical marijuana cardholders does not
violate state law. Consequently, the use of drug-detection canines trained to
detect marijuana is no longer uniquely selective because it now discloses
the presence of property possessed in compliance with the law in which the
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Moreover, in light of
Montana’s changes in marijuana law, the use of drug-detection canines
trained to detect marijuana is now an investigative technique as intrusive as
other investigative techniques, such as thermal imaging and wiretaps, which
generally require probable cause and a warrant.77
Before this comment moves into the facts of the case at hand, take note
of what has been covered so far. An officer seizes an individual every time
the officer initiates a traffic stop. That seizure triggers constitutional scru-
tiny, and to pass muster, the officer must have had particularized suspicion
of a traffic violation or criminal activity prior to pulling the vehicle over.
Once this bar is met, under Montana law, the officer must have particular-
ized suspicion of criminal drug activity prior to expanding the traffic stop
into a drug-investigation. Additionally, under Montana law, the officer must
have particularized suspicion of criminal drug activity prior to initiating use
of a drug-detection canine. Moreover, under both the Montana Constitution
and the United States Constitution, if the officer, in order to allow a drug-
detection canine to sniff the exterior of the vehicle, extends the stop beyond
a reasonable time needed to effectuate the purpose of the stop, the officer
has unreasonably seized the individual, and any evidence obtained thereaf-
ter must be excluded.
75. See e.g., State v. Estes, 403 P.3d 1249 (Mont. 2017); State v. Wilson, 430 P.3d 77 (Mont.
2018).
76. Tackitt, 67 P.3d at 302.
77. See e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (thermal imaging “is a ‘search’ and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant”).
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III. STATE V. WILSON
A. Facts and Procedure
Montana Highway Patrolman Cody Smith, while parked on the side of
U.S. Highway 2 near Chinook, Montana, observed a vehicle with a North
Dakota license plate approaching from the rear.78 The occupants of the ve-
hicle passing Smith’s patrol car looked over at the patrol car and quickly
looked away.79 After Officer Smith ran the vehicle’s plates and discovered
expired registration, he initiated a traffic stop.80
Officer Smith informed the driver, Scott Paramore, that expired regis-
tration was the reason for the stop.81 In Officer Smith’s opinion, Paramore
and passenger Johnathan Wilson, appeared visibly nervous and avoided eye
contact.82 Officer Smith noted old food items on the floor and “a lived-in
appearance” of the vehicle.83 After Officer Smith unsuccessfully requested
identification from Paramore, he asked Paramore to walk to the patrol car.84
Paramore kept an unlit cigarette in his mouth when they walked back to the
patrol car, which Officer Smith found unusual.85
Once in the patrol car, Paramore informed Officer Smith that they
were returning from his wedding in Idaho.86 Despite Paramore explaining
that his wife was travelling in a separate vehicle because: (1) she arrived in
Idaho before he did to set up the wedding; (2) was transporting their three
children; and (3) did not need to return to work in North Dakota as soon as
Paramore did, Officer Smith thought it was strange that Paramore was not
driving with his wife.87
Paramore explained to Officer Smith that the vehicle they were driving
was registered to his co-worker, who let them borrow it for the trip.88 After
Officer Smith questioned how long Paramore had known the owner,
Paramore responded “four or five months.”89 Officer Smith felt it was unu-
sual that a co-worker who only knew Paramore for a few months would
have loaned him a vehicle.90 Officer Smith, doubting the validity of
Paramore’s account, continued to question Paramore about the reasons for
78. Wilson, 430 P.3d at 79.
79. Id.
80. Id.




85. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 4, State v. Wilson (Mont. Jan. 30, 2018) (No. DA 17-0550).
86. Wilson, 430 P.3d at 80.
87. Id.
88. Brief of Appellee, supra note 81, at 4.
89. Wilson, 430 P.3d at 80.
90. Brief of Appellee, supra note 81, at 4.
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driving separately from his wife.91 Then, Officer Smith returned to the pas-
senger side of the vehicle to see if Wilson could find a valid insurance
card.92
Wilson, despite failing to provide valid insurance, independently cor-
roborated that they were indeed returning from Paramore’s wedding in
Idaho, along with the reasons Paramore drove separately from his wife, and
the fact that the vehicle belonged to Paramore’s co-worker. Officer Smith,
after returning to his patrol car, checked Paramore and Wilson’s criminal
history and discovered that Paramore had a history of drug charges.93
Paramore confirmed this finding and admitted that he had been on proba-
tion two years ago for a marijuana related charge.94
At this point, Officer Smith left the patrol car to make a call to Agent
Ost, a border patrol agent with a drug-detection canine.95 Officer Smith
requested that Agent Ost bring the drug-detection canine to assist with the
investigation.96 While Officer Smith was on the radio requesting the drug-
detection canine, Paramore opened the patrol car door, which Smith be-
lieved indicated Paramore’s attempt to listen in on the conversation.97 This
“continued to make [Officer Smith] suspect that Paramore was extremely
nervous.”98
Three minutes after the radio request for the drug-detection canine,
Officer Smith issued Paramore citations for failure to provide proof of in-
surance and for operating a vehicle with expired registration.99 However,
before Paramore could leave the patrol car, Officer Smith requested that he
stay for further questioning.100
Officer Smith informed Paramore that U.S. Highway 2 was a known
drug trafficking corridor and asked whether there were any drugs in the
vehicle.101 Paramore denied that any drugs were in the vehicle, to which
Officer Smith returned a request to search the vehicle.102 Paramore did not
consent to the search.103 Officer Smith asked if he would be willing to wait
for a drug-detection canine to arrive.104 Paramore stated he would “prefer
91. Wilson, 430 P.3d at 80.
92. Brief of Appellee, supra note 81, at 4.
93. Id. at 5.






100. Brief of Appellee, supra note 81, at 5.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 5–6.
104. Id. at 6.
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not to wait.”105 Officer Smith, then informed Paramore that a drug-detec-
tion canine would search the vehicle and that he needed to wait for this to
occur.106
After the drug-detection canine inspected the vehicle, Agent Ost in-
formed Officer Smith that the canine had indicated drugs were in the vehi-
cle.107 Officer Smith notified Wilson and Paramore that, due to the canine’s
alert, he would be applying for a warrant to search the vehicle.108 While
Officer Smith awaited the warrant, he permitted Paramore and Wilson to
leave the scene on foot.109
The officers, after obtaining a search warrant, conducted a thorough
search of the vehicle.110 The search revealed a small bag of marijuana and a
pipe in the vehicle’s center console, and a large bag of marijuana in the
trunk, totaling over a half-pound of marijuana.111 Law enforcement arrested
Paramore and Wilson soon thereafter in Havre, Montana.112
The State charged Wilson with multiple drug charges.113 Wilson filed
a motion to suppress the evidence gathered from the vehicle.114 The district
court of the 17th Judicial District denied the motion, reasoning that Officer
Smith had sufficient factual support to expand the traffic stop into a drug
investigation and particularized suspicion of drug activity which justified
the use of a drug-detection canine on the vehicle’s exterior.115 Wilson plead
no contest to Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, a felony, reserving
his right to appeal. The Montana Supreme Court decided the appeal as fol-
lows.
B. Holding
Chief Justice Mike McGrath, joined by five other Justices of the Mon-
tana Supreme Court, delivered the opinion, holding that Officer Smith
lacked the particularized suspicion required to extend the traffic stop and
that Officer Smith’s use of a drug-detection canine violated Montana’s con-
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 85, at 8.
108. Id.
109. Brief of Appellee, supra note 81, at 6.
110. State v. Wilson, 430 P.3d 77, 81 (Mont. 2018).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (charging Wilson with Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs with Intent to Distribute, a
felony, in violation of MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–9–103; Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, a
felony in violation of MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–9–102(1); and Criminal Possession of Drug Parapherna-
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stitutional shield against unreasonable searches.116 Consequently, after find-
ing the district court erroneously denied Wilson’s motion to suppress evi-
dence, the Montana Supreme Court reversed Wilson’s conviction.117 The
majority reasoned, “a messy vehicle, a nervous driver with an unlit ciga-
rette, daylight use of a Montana highway, using a borrowed vehicle, and the
fact that newlyweds aren’t traveling together following their wedding does
not amount to particularized suspicion.”118
The Montana Supreme Court thoughtfully distinguished the facts of
Wilson from those of State v. Estes. In Estes, the officer pulled over a vehi-
cle for a routine traffic stop, and upon noticing numerous air fresheners,
two cell phones, and a stack of cash in the center console, the officer al-
lowed his drug-detection canine to sniff the exterior of the vehicle.119 Un-
like Estes, where the presence of numerous air fresheners, the plain view
observation of two cell phones, and a stack of cash was sufficient factual
support giving rise to particularized suspicion,120 here Officer Smith did not
articulate any specific facts demonstrating criminal behavior. Therefore, the
Montana Supreme Court held that Officer Smith did not have the requisite
particularized suspicion of criminal activity needed to initiate use of a drug-
detection canine.121 Additionally, the Montana Supreme Court emphasized
that the purpose of the stop was to ticket Paramore for expired registration,
and after Officer Smith issued the citations he should have concluded the
stop.122
C. Dissent
Justice Jim Rice, the only Justice to dissent, agreed with the district
court’s denial of Wilson’s motion to suppress evidence.123 Justice Rice
pointed to the “lived-in” appearance of the vehicle, lack of eye contact with
Officer Smith, use of a known drug trafficking corridor, use of a borrowed
car, the exceptional nervousness of Wilson and Paramore, along with
Paramore’s prior drug charges as indicators that gave rise to particularized
suspicion of drug activity.124 Although Justice Rice stated that past drug
charges alone would not constitute particularized suspicion, he emphasized
prior drug charges should not be considered an “innocent indicator.”125
116. Id. at 83.
117. Id. at 79.
118. Id. at 83.
119. State v. Estes, 403 P.3d 1249, 1251 (Mont. 2017).
120. Id. at 1254.
121. Wilson, 430 P.3d at 83.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 84–85.
125. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF STATE V. WILSON
The Montana Supreme Court correctly held that Officer Smith lacked
the particularized suspicion of criminal drug activity required to initiate use
of the drug-detection canine. Moreover, the dissent’s reliance on
Paramore’s prior conviction for marijuana possession as indication that he
currently possessed marijuana was misplaced. While the Montana Supreme
Court correctly held that Officer Smith lacked particularized suspicion of
criminal drug activity, it did not expressly address that the nervousness of
Wilson and Paramore, relied on by Officer Smith to justify his use of the
drug-detection canine, was based in-part on nervousness arising after Of-
ficer Smith had requested the canine unit.
A. Intimidation Resulting in Nervousness
While the Montana Supreme Court correctly analyzed the facts of Wil-
son when holding that Officer Smith lacked particularized suspicion of
criminal activity, it did not directly address Officer Smith’s radio request
for the drug-detection canine as a means to intimidate Wilson and Paramore
into a state of nervousness, nor his later reliance on such nervousness as
justification for the use of the drug-detection canine. Permitting an officer
to develop particularized suspicion based on an individual’s nerves which
result from the officer’s show of authority endangers our fundamental rights
of security and privacy, while impinging on individual liberty.
An officer cannot rely on information collected during a search to pro-
vide reason for initiating the search in the first place. This is exactly why
warrants are required before a search commences.126 By the same logic, an
officer must notice objective indications of criminal activity before com-
mencing a search under an exception to the warrant requirement. Constitu-
tional rights of security and privacy would be futile if officers were able to,
without particularized suspicion of criminal activity, snoop through private
matters simply to use what they have found as justification of the intrusive
search they already conducted. As Justice Jackson once stated, “uncon-
trolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in
the arsenal of every arbitrary government.”127 Permitting investigative
searches to be justified by evidence uncovered during the search, would
126. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964))
(a search without a warrant “bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of
probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification
for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight
judgment”).
127. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
18
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subject many innocent people to extended inquiry, undue delay, and need-
less frustration.
Here, the Montana Supreme Court, when holding that Officer Smith
lacked particularized suspicion, should have expressly acknowledged that
Officer Smith incorrectly relied on Paramore’s nerves as post-hoc rationali-
zation for the search.128 Paramore, as most people would, became nervous
when the officer called a drug-detection canine to the routine traffic stop.129
Permitting an officer to intimidate an individual as a way to drum up ner-
vousness, and then allowing the officer to use that nervousness as factual
support of particularized suspicion, places an unsettling amount of power in
law enforcement officers.130 The Montana Supreme Court in Wilson cor-
rectly held that Officer Smith lacked the particularized suspicion required to
initiate use of a drug-detection canine, however, it should have expressly
addressed that Officer Smith’s use of intimidation, and his reliance on the
resulting nervousness to support particularized suspicion, was unreasonable.
B. Paramore’s Past Conviction
Justice Rice’s reliance on Paramore’s previous drug history as a key
indicator of illegal drug activity runs counter to the rehabilitative purposes
of probation and incarceration. While, based on a probationer’s diminished
expectation of privacy, a person’s rights during probation may be lim-
ited,131 upon successful completion of probation, the expectation of privacy
returns. If fulfilling sentencing requirements for prior criminal acts, instead
of restoring an individual’s rights, permanently affords that individual
fewer constitutional protections, such individuals have no incentive to avoid
criminal activity in the future. The dissent’s theory that Paramore’s comple-
tion of probation was not an innocent indicator, therefore, perpetuates the
stereotype that once a drug-user, always a drug-user.
Moreover, Wilson was not the one with a history of drug charges. That
was Paramore. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he infer-
ence that persons who talk to narcotics addicts are engaged in the criminal
traffic of narcotics is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required to
support an intrusion by the police upon an individual’s personal secur-
ity.”132 Stripping away a citizen’s rights just because he or she is traveling
128. Wilson, 430 P.3d at 80.
129. See Maclin, supra note 20, at 144 (“a traffic stop interrupts a motorist’s ‘freedom of movement,
is annoying and time consuming, and often generates ‘substantial anxiety,’ even for the law-abiding
motorist who has not committed a crime”).
130. Id. at 189 (the bulk of police officers’ abuse of power is “shouldered by innocent motorists”).
131. State v. Charlie, 239 P.3d 934, 941 (Mont. 2010) (requiring merely reasonable cause for war-
rantless search of the person, vehicle, or residence of somebody on probation or parole).
132. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62–63 (1968).
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with somebody that successfully completed probation a number of years
ago133 not only contravenes the fundamental nature of those rights, but also
further isolates and ostracizes those with prior drug charges. Those without
prior drug charges will be less likely to travel or associate with people with
such charges if, by riding in a vehicle with somebody who at one point was
arrested for marijuana possession, they lose their fundamental rights. This
paradox only perpetuates recidivism by relegating those with misdemeanor
marijuana convictions to associate only with people who have criminal
records—likely including felons and violent offenders. Instead of promot-
ing those individuals struggling with substance abuse problems to become
thriving members of society, the dissent seeks to inhibit those who have
completed their sentences from integrating back into society.
The following section discusses the critical flaws in the rationale sup-
porting reduced constitutional scrutiny of government use of drug-detection
canines. Specifically, it suggests that the defense should have raised the
argument that, in light of Montana’s Medical Marijuana Act, the particular-
ized suspicion standard should no longer apply to government use of drug-
detection canines trained to detect marijuana.
V. NOSING FORWARD: THE FUTURE OF DRUG-DETECTION CANINES
Criminalized marijuana possession is quickly becoming an outdated
doctrine. Despite the Federal Controlled Substances Act classifying mari-
juana as a Schedule I drug due to its alleged lack of known medical bene-
fits,134 at the time of this publication, 37 states permit medical use of mari-
juana,135 and each have established regulatory systems for the cultivation,
133. See e.g. Wilson, 430 P.3d at 80.
134. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2018). See also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2005) (holding, despite
state laws permitting medical use of marijuana, the Controlled Substance Act is valid exertion of Con-
gress’ power to regulate commerce among the several states).
135. ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.030 (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36–2801; ARK. CONST.
Amend. 98, § 1; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1 (LexisNexis 2020); COLO. CONST.
Art. XVIII, § 14; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408 (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. 16, § 4901A; D.C.
CODE § 7–1671.01 (2020); FLA. CONST. Art. X, § 29; GA. CODE ANN. § 43–34–120 (2019); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 329–121; 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 130/1 (2020); IND. CODE ANN. § 24–4–21-
1 (LexisNexis 2020); IOWA CODE § 124E.1; LA. STAT. ANN. § 1168.1 (2019); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. 22 § 2421 (2019); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-3301.1 (LexisNexis 2019); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 94I, § 1; MICH COMP LAWS SERV. § 333.26421 (LexisNexis 2019); MINN. STAT.
§ 152.21; MO. CONST. Art. XIV, § 1; MONT. CODE ANN. § 50–46–301 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 453A.010 - 453A.810 (LexisNexis 2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 126–X:1; N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 24:6I–1; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-1 (2019); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3360 (McKinney
2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-24.1-01 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3796.01 (LexisNexis
2020); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 63 § 15–420 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.010 (2019); 35 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 10231.303 (2019); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21–28.6–1 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26–61a–101
(LexisNexis 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 18 § 4474b (2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.515A.005.
(2019); W. VA. CODE § 16A–1–1 (2019).
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distribution, and use of marijuana for medical use. Of those 37 states, 11
states also permit recreational marijuana136 more recently referred to as
“adult-use cannabis.”137 The states allowing adult-use cannabis express nu-
merous legislative purposes including shifting law enforcement focus to vi-
olent and property crimes,138 regulating and taxing the marijuana indus-
try,139 disbanding the unregulated marijuana markets,140 restricting use by
minors141 and enhancing revenue for public purposes.142 While, under fed-
eral law, marijuana remains illegal to possess for either medical or recrea-
tional purposes, since 2014, the Consolidated Appropriations Act has pro-
hibited the United States Department of Justice from spending funds to fed-
erally prosecute individuals who engage in conduct permissible under state
medical marijuana laws.143
Relevant here, in 2004 the Montana legislature enacted the Montana
Medical Marijuana Act (MMA).144 The MMA provides legal protections
against not only arrest and prosecution for marijuana offenses, but also ex-
136. ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.010 (2019); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1 (Lexis-
Nexis 2020); COLO. CONST. Art. XVIII, § 16; D.C. CODE § 48–904.01 (2020); 410 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 130/1 (2020) 2019 ILL. LAWS 27; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 28-B § 1501 (2019); MASS.
ANN. LAWS Ch. 94G, § 7; MICH COMP LAWS SERV. § 333.27951 (LexisNexis 2019).; NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 453D.020 (LexisNexis 2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.010 (2019); VT. STAT. ANN.
TIT. 18 § 4230a (2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.4013 (2019).
137. Certain state legislatures have substituted the term “adult-use cannabis” for what was more
commonly referred to as “recreational” marijuana, presumably to acknowledge that adults may choose
to use marijuana for myriad reasons, only one of which might be recreation. See, e.g. Adult and Medical
Use of Cannabis Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 475B.010 (2019); see People v. McKnight, 446 P.3d 397, 409
(Colo. 2019) (discussing multiple uses of marijuana).
138. ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.010 (2019); see also NEVADA REV. STAT. ANN. § 453D.020 (2019).
139. 2016 Prop. 64 note following CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11018; see COLO CONST. art.
XVIII, § 16(a).
140. Note following WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.334 (2019).
141. 2016 Prop. 64 note following CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11018 (2020).
142. NEVADA REV. STAT. ANN. § 453D.020(2) (2019) (revenue dedicated to public education);
COLO CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(a). Colorado has obtained over $1 billion in State revenue since it legal-
ized adult-use cannabis in 2014, netting $500 million of that in the last two years, https://perma.cc/
3BXB-9GAM.
143. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 538, 132 Stat. 348 (2017);
United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2016). But see Montana Caregivers Assoc.,
LLC v. United States, 841 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1149-50 (D. Mont. 2012) (prior to the Consolidated Appro-
priations Act limiting DOJ funding for medical marijuana prosecution, the Commerce Clause provided
the DOJ with power to enforce medical marijuana possession and distribution under the Controlled
Substances Act). See also Kyle Jaeger, House-Passed Marijuana Amendments Stripped From Congres-
sional Spending Bills, Marijuana Moment (Dec. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/LW7A-DMDS (a similar
appropriations rider prohibiting federal spending on prosecution of persons in compliance with state
recreational and adult-use marijuana laws did not obtain senate consent).
144. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-101 (repealed in 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-301 (2019).
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plicitly protects against the denial of constitutional rights.145 The MMA
provides, subject to certain location limitations,146 that
an individual who possesses a registry identification card or license issued
pursuant to this part may not be arrested, prosecuted, or penalized in any
manner or be denied any right or privilege . . . solely because the person
cultivates, manufactures, possesses, or transports marijuana in the amounts
allowed under this section; or the registered cardholder acquires or uses ma-
rijuana.147
The regular enactment of appropriations riders, beginning in 2014,
protecting those in the medical marijuana industry from federal prosecution,
followed by the 2016 amendments to the MMA which enabled licensed
providers to serve more than three patients148 heralded a new era of mari-
juana law in Montana. From 2016 to 2019, the number of medical mari-
juana patients obtaining effective care increased by 342%, now totaling
34,413 patients.149 The substantial increase in prevalence of Montanans
lawfully using, cultivating, and possessing marijuana has significantly in-
creased the likelihood that drug-detection canines will give false positive
alerts.
Before the MMA permitted medical marijuana possession, drug-detec-
tion canines trained to detect marijuana and other drugs were uniquely se-
lective in disclosing only the presence of contraband. However, this no
longer holds true. While a positive alert from a drug-detection canine
trained to detect marijuana is reliable indication that a person possesses
marijuana, a positive alert no longer reliably indicates that a person pos-
sesses marijuana illegally. A positive alert could very well be indicating
that a person possesses marijuana in compliance with the MMA. Moreover,
those permitted to possess marijuana have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the medicine they use.
With this supporting rationale of unique selectivity crumbling under
the weight of the MMA, Montana courts should re-evaluate the use of drug-
detection canines trained to detect marijuana based upon mere particular-
ized suspicion. While a case where a drug-detection canine discovers a per-
son’s lawfully possessed medical marijuana would be the ideal case for the
Montana Supreme Court to reconsider this area of its search and seizure
doctrine, any case in which an officer uses a drug-detection canine trained
to detect marijuana based upon mere particularized suspicion will suf-
145. Id. § 50–46–319(2).
146. Id. § 50–46–320.
147. Id. § 50–46–319(2).
148. Montana’s medical marijuana laws and history, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT (2020), https://
perma.cc/D3G8-K38X.
149. Seaborn Larson, Number of Montana medical marijuana card holders surges 342% in three
years, MISSOULIAN (Jun 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/67KR-F7D4.
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fice.150 If the defense in Wilson had challenged the validity of the particu-
larized suspicion standard with respect to drug-detection canines trained to
detect marijuana, the Montana Supreme Court would have had the opportu-
nity to correct the current flaws in its drug-detection canine jurisprudence.
A. Re-evaluating Tackitt’s Reasoning
Tackitt’s reasoning, which allows an officer to use a drug-detection
canine trained to detect marijuana based upon mere particularized suspi-
cion, is flawed in two ways. First, the rationale that use of a drug-detection
canine reveals only the presence or absence of contraband is no longer valid
because canines trained to detect marijuana cannot distinguish between law-
fully possessed marijuana and illegally possessed marijuana. Second, Tack-
itt improperly balances government law enforcement interests against indi-
vidual privacy interests.
1. Indistinguishable Scents and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
As discussed above, in Montana, an officer may initiate use of a drug-
detection canine based upon mere particularized suspicion of criminal activ-
ity.151 The Montana Supreme Court, in Tackitt, held that use of a drug-
detection canine to sniff the trunk of a parked vehicle did, in fact, constitute
a search.152 However, the Montana Supreme Court, instead of requiring the
same level of factual support it requires for any other warrantless search of
an automobile— “the existence of probable cause as well as a generally
applicable exception to the warrant requirement such as a plain view search,
a search incident to arrest, or exigent circumstances,”153 the Montana Su-
preme Court allowed the use of a drug-detection canine based upon much
less factual indicia of criminal activity. The Montana Supreme Court justi-
fied this reduced standard because the use of the drug-detection canine was
minimally intrusive and revealed only the presence or absence of illegal
substances.154 Importantly, at the time the Montana Supreme Court decided
Tackitt, the Montana legislature had not passed the MMA and possession of
marijuana was illegal for all people in the state. However, under the MMA,
certain amounts of marijuana may now be lawfully possessed by registered
cardholders. Consequently, the drug-detection canines trained to detect ma-
150. See e.g. People v. McKnight, 446 P.3d 397, 399 (Colo. 2019) (a methamphetamine case that re-
evaluated the search and seizure doctrine surrounding drug-detection canines trained to detect mari-
juana).
151. State v. Tackitt, 67 P.3d 295, 303 (Mont. 2003).
152. Id. at 300–01.
153. State v. Elison, 14 P.3d 456, 471 (Mont. 2000) (discussing the requirements of a warrantless
search of an automobile).
154. Tackitt, 67 P.3d at 302–303.
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rijuana indiscriminately disclose the presence of both lawfully possessed
marijuana and illegally possessed marijuana.
The Supreme Court of Colorado, in People v. McKnight, recently ad-
dressed a similar issue — a drug-detection canine’s inability to distinguish
between lawful possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
methamphetamine. In McKnight, the officer, based upon particularized sus-
picion of methamphetamine possession,155 requested back-up bring a drug-
detection canine that had been trained to detect odors of methamphetamine,
cocaine, heroin, ecstasy, and marijuana.156 The drug-detection canine was
trained to give the same alert upon detection of any of those five drugs.157
The Colorado Supreme Court held that, due to the canine’s inability to dis-
tinguish between lawful possession of marijuana158 and illegal possession
of methamphetamine, an officer may not initiate use of a drug-detection
canine trained to detect marijuana, unless the officer has “probable cause to
believe that an item or area contains drugs in violation of state law.”159
The same logic applied in McKnight holds true in states such as Mon-
tana where, despite recreational marijuana being illegal, medical marijuana
is legal. Just as the drug-detection canine in McKnight could not distinguish
between legal marijuana and illegal methamphetamine, a drug-detection ca-
nine trained to detect marijuana cannot distinguish between legally pos-
sessed medical marijuana and illegally possessed marijuana. Drug-detection
canines trained to detect marijuana no longer provide a yes-or-no answer to
the question of whether illegal narcotics are present in a vehicle.160
Now, the canine may alert to lawfully possessed marijuana, violating
the individual’s reasonable expectation in his or her lawful possession.161
What a person uses marijuana for, whether to “treat symptoms of a chronic
illness, mitigate mental health conditions, or [currently in 11 states] engage
in recreational activities” is reasonably expected to remain private.162 Use
of a drug-detection canine trained to alert to the presence of marijuana in-
vades that expectation of privacy. And, unless an officer has “probable
cause as well as a generally applicable exception to the warrant require-
155. See McKnight, 446 P.3d at 400—401 (the trial court “conclude[d] that there was reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity supporting the search).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, §16(a)(3) (The Colorado Constitution permits adults 21 years of age
or older to lawfully possess up to an ounce of marijuana).
159. McKnight, 446 P.3d at 400.
160. Id. at 406.
161. Id. at 408.
162. Id. at 409; see also State v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 441, 449 (Mont. 1997) (recognizing a reasonable
expectation of privacy in an individual’s medical records).
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ment,”163 the officer should not be allowed, without a warrant, to use a
drug-detection canine that alerts to marijuana. Consequently, in states per-
mitting either medical or adult-use marijuana, use of drug-detection canines
trained to detect marijuana based on mere particularized suspicion is no
longer justified.
2. Governmental Interests in Enforcing Drug Prohibitions
The Court in Tackitt, when holding that officers may use drug-detec-
tion canines based on mere particularized suspicion relied on Hulse which
closely follows the rationale of Terry.164 Terry and Hulse, which weighed
the dangers of armed suspects and drunk drivers against constitutional pro-
tections of privacy, ultimately decided the interests of officer and highway
safety justified “carefully limited search[es],”165 including weapons frisks
and field sobriety tests, based upon mere particularized suspicion. The
Court in Tackitt, followed this balancing approach, but instead of balancing
the government’s safety interests against the individual privacy interests, it
balanced the government’s “law enforcement interests” against the individ-
ual privacy interests.166
Presumably, the Tackitt Court avoided balancing the safety interests
against privacy interests because the direct safety concerns arising from the
suspected drug-trafficking were already addressed by Terry and Hulse.
Under Terry and Hulse, an officer would be able to conduct a weapons frisk
to protect themselves from weapons used by illegal drug-traffickers or a
field sobriety test to protect people on roadways from an individual who is
driving under the influence of the drugs they are suspected to be trafficking.
But, does drug-trafficking have other indirect safety concerns? Could Tack-
itt be justified by the safety concerns that possession or trafficking of illegal
drugs will lead to overdose by those who ultimately consume the drugs?
Granted, consumption of certain drugs, opiates for example, are dan-
gerous to the individuals consuming them, however, marijuana consump-
tion, whether legally or illegally consumed, is demonstrably safer than other
illicit substances.167 The Montana Legislature recognizes this by making
possession of marijuana a misdemeanor, while making possession of other
163. State v. Elison, 14 P.3d 456, 471 (Mont. 2000) (discussing the requirements of a warrantless
search of an automobile).
164. State v. Tackitt, 67 P.3d 295, 302 (Mont. 2003); see also Hulse v. Department of Justice, 961
P.2d 75, 86–87 (Mont. 1997).
165. Hulse, 961 P.2d at 86–87.
166. Tackitt, 67 P.3d at 302 (emphasis added).
167. The CDC reported 63,600 drug overdoses in 2016. National Center for Health Statistics, Drug
Overdose Deaths in the United States, 1999-2016, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
(Dec. 2017), https://perma.cc/LD3E-KNBS. C.f. CDC report that marijuana overdoes is “unlikely.” Na-
tional Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Is it possible to “overdose” or have
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drugs a felony.168 Thus, allowing drug-detection canines trained to detect
marijuana the same reduced constitutional scrutiny as those trained to detect
more dangerous drugs like heroin, is not justified.
Moreover, a person like Tackitt or Wilson, who illegally possesses ma-
rijuana and refrains from consuming it before driving, poses much less dan-
ger to society than somebody who ingests a lawful intoxicant, like alcohol,
and gets behind the wheel of an automobile.169 An individual possessing
marijuana cannot injure the investigating officer with the drugs, nor can the
individual endanger highway safety by merely possessing the drugs. The
safety concerns which justified the reduction in constitutional scrutiny for
weapons frisks and field sobriety tests, are not present to justify reducing
the constitutional scrutiny of drug-detection canines trained to detect mari-
juana.
Further, while the Tackitt Court recognized Montana’s “interest in dis-
couraging illegal drug trafficking is substantial,”170 that interest is not com-
pelling and does not justify infringing the individual right of privacy. De-
spite delegates at Montana’s Constitutional Convention suggesting that the
right of privacy must yield to the compelling interest of conducting reasona-
ble searches,171 the delegates also discussed the weaknesses of traditional
property-based search and seizure law.172 Delegate Bob Campbell acknowl-
edged that “the government must come into our lives at some point,” how-
ever, he qualified that statement by requiring that the government must
have a good—i.e. compelling— reason for doing so.173
While the Montana Supreme Court has held that the government inter-
est in conducting reasonable searches and seizures based on “probable
cause” is compelling justification to infringe the individual right of pri-
vacy,174 it has not recognized searches and seizures based on “particular-
ized suspicion” as similarly compelling interests.
a “bad reaction” to marijuana?, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (March 7, 2018),
https://perma.cc/C4NU-T9AN.
168. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-102(1)—(3).
169. National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Impaired Driving: Get the Facts, Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (March 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/AQY3-KZ8E (in 2016, 10,497
people died in alcohol-impaired driving crashes, accounting for 28% of all traffic-related deaths in the
United States).
170. Tackitt, 67 P.3d at 302.
171. 6 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT 1852–53 (because the people have a right to be
free only from unreasonable searches and seizures, the state has a compelling interest to conduct rea-
sonable searches and seizures).
172. Id. at 1681.
173. Id.
174. State v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 441, 449 (Mont. 1997).
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Tackitt itself concedes that the government’s interest in discouraging
illegal drug trafficking is merely substantial, but not compelling.175 Absent
the compelling safety interests present in Hulse and Terry, the holding in
Tackitt violates the individual right of privacy. Furthermore, any argument
that suggests the individual right of privacy must yield to the government’s
interest in enforcing laws through reasonable search and seizures is mis-
placed, unless such searches and seizures are based on probable cause.
Therefore, the Montana Supreme Court should require, prior to an officer’s
warrantless use of a drug-detection canine trained to detect marijuana, “the
existence of probable cause as well as a generally applicable exception to
the warrant requirement such as a plain view search, a search incident to
arrest, or exigent circumstances.”176
3. Alternate Judicial Options
Alternatively, the Montana Supreme Court could maintain Tackitt, and
simply require that prior to using drug-detection canines, officers have par-
ticularized suspicion of drug activity that violates state law. This would
require officers to provide specific, articulable facts that the item or area to
be searched contains drugs other than marijuana,177 or if the officer suspects
the item or area to be searched contains marijuana, that the individual fails
to comply with the MMA, e.g. does not display a registry identification card
upon demand.178
One way for officers to clearly identify which drug other than mari-
juana they suspect the individual to possess is to refer to a list of illegal
drugs and notice any objective indications of piqued interest when inquiring
whether the individual possesses any of the specific drugs.179
As for establishing that an individual suspected of marijuana posses-
sion is suspected of violating state law, the officer must provide specific
articulable facts that such an individual is not in compliance with the MMA.
To do so, the officer merely needs to request that such an individual display
a valid registry identification card. The MMA requires a registered card-
175. State v. Tackitt, 67 P.3d 295, 302 (Mont. 2003). The interest in discouraging illegal drug traf-
ficking may be better served by legalizing adult-use marijuana. See note following WASH. REV. CODE
§ 69.50.334 (2019) (discussing express legislative purposes of legalizing adult-use marijuana including
disbanding the unregulated marijuana markets).
176. State v. Elison, 14 P.3d 456, 471 (Mont. 2000) (discussing the requirements of a warrantless
search of an automobile).
177. See e.g. State v. Espinoza, 2019 WL 5382516 at *3 (Mont. 2019) (officer observed defendant
exhibit unique physical movements when asked about the presence of methamphetamine in her vehicle).
178. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 50–46–319(8) (possession of registration identification card presumes
compliance with MMA)
179. See e.g. Espinoza, 2019 WL 5382516 at * 2 (officer noted objective indications of heightened
nervousness when asking individual if methamphetamine was present in the vehicle).
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holder to display his or her identification card upon demand,180 and it
presumes those individuals in possession of a registry identification card to
be in compliance.181 If the individual suspected of possessing marijuana
fails to display a registry identification card when an officer demands, the
officer continues to have particularized suspicion of criminal activity be-
cause the individual would not be in compliance the MMA. However, if the
individual does display his or her registry identification card, the officer
must presume that the individual is in compliance with applicable law, and
any particularized suspicion of unlawful possession of marijuana would,
therefore, be dispelled.
Moreover, in Montana, the MMA provides not only a defense to be
raised at trial but also maintains the cardholder’s right to be free from un-
reasonable searches and seizures.182 Any argument stating that a registered
card-holder can fight the seizure of lawfully possessed marijuana in court,
while a truthful statement, does not encompass the entire truth. It disregards
both the card-holder’s presumption of compliance with the MMA and the
card-holder’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
officer, without objective data from which he or she can infer that an indi-
vidual possesses drugs illegally, the officer should not initiate use of a drug-
detection canine.
Requiring officers to ask individuals if they are registered card-holders
before initiating use of a drug-detection canine trained to detect marijuana
may seem unduly burdensome on the officers, given that there are only
34,413 registered card-holders in Montana,183 a state with over 1 million
residents.184 However, this is the best way to prevent denial of Montana’s
registered card holders’ rights to privacy and freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures.185 The Massachusetts Supreme Court adopted such a
position in Commonwealth v. Canning.186
In Massachusetts, prior to a search, an officer must provide factual
support that the individual or property in question “is not or probably not
180. City of Missoula v. Shumway, 434 P.3d 918, 921 (Mont. 2019) (citing MONT. CODE. ANN.
§ 50–46–317 (2017)).
181. Id. (citing MONT. CODE. ANN. § 50–46–319(8) (2017)).
182. See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 50-46-319 (registered cardholders may not be denied any right); see
also Shumway, 434 P.3d at 921, n.1 (noting the MMA affords a defense, not an affirmative defense,
because affirmative defenses only apply when the conduct being defended is actually unlawful).
183. Larson, supra note 149.
184. United States Census Bureau, QuickFacts Montana (last visited Jan. 14, 2020), https://perma
.cc/YMY3-PZS9.
185. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 50–46–319(2) (2019).
186. 28 N.E.3d 1156 (Mass. 2015) (superseded by statute); see MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 94G, §7
(legalizing recreational use of marijuana and cultivation of no more than 6 marijuana plants); see also
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 94 N.E.3d 819, 827 n.9 (Mass. 2018).
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registered to cultivate [or possess] the marijuana at issue.”187 The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court analogized the medical marijuana registry card to
that of a license to possess certain firearms, where the possession of those
firearms are illegal without a license, but with a license possession is legal.
Canning notes that, “although firearms cannot legally be carried without a
license to carry, in the absence of any evidence beyond the ‘unadorned fact’
that the defendant was carrying a gun, there [is] no probable cause to sus-
pect a crime was being committed.”188 Similarly, the unadorned suspicion
that a person possesses marijuana does not provide probable cause or even
particularized suspicion that the individual has committed a crime. Canning
holds that an officer seeking to search for evidence of illegal marijuana
possession or cultivation “must offer information sufficient to provide prob-
able cause to believe the individual is not properly registered under the act
to possess or cultivate the suspected substance.”189 Canning, therefore,
places on the investigating officer the burden to confirm or dispel whether
an individual suspected of marijuana possession has a valid registry identi-
fication card before searching that individual.190
Montana should adopt the Canning approach because it aligns with the
current construction of Montana’s MMA, which places the burden on inves-
tigating officers to confirm whether an individual possess a registry identifi-
cation card. In Montana, a registered cardholder need not “display” the reg-
istry identification card to be presumed in compliance, he or she merely
needs to “possess” the card.191 Unless an officer demands to see an individ-
ual’s registry identification card, the registered cardholder is not bound to
disclose his or her private medical information. In order for an officer, in-
vestigating an individual suspected of marijuana possession, to have partic-
ularized suspicion of criminal activity, the investigating officer must deter-
mine whether such an individual is or is not a registered cardholder.192
Must a registered cardholder stopped for a minor traffic infraction as-
sume that he or she is also under investigation for the possession of illegal
drugs and disclose that he or she suffers from a debilitating medical condi-
tion just to suggest compliance with a law he or she is statutorily presumed
to be in compliance with? Or consider an officer, suspecting a registered
cardholder of cultivating marijuana, who plans on searching the card-
holder’s property when the cardholder is not present. Must all medical ma-
rijuana patients post a sign on their front door stating they suffer from a
187. Canning, 28 N.E.3d at 1165.
188. Id. at 1164.
189. Id. at 1158.
190. But see State v. Sisco, 373 P.3d 549, 554—555 (Ariz. 2016) (rejecting the “odor or sight plus”
standard which roughly equates to the standard suggested here).
191. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 50–46–319.
192. Id. (requiring display of a valid registry identification card only upon demand).
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debilitating medical condition for which they are prescribed medical mari-
juana in order to suggest compliance with medical marijuana laws? Mon-
tana’s MMA suggests not. Possession of a valid registry identification is
enough.
But what about people like Wilson and Paramore, who were not regis-
tered cardholders. Must an officer inquire whether they possess a registry
identification card before initiating use of a drug-detection canine trained to
detect marijuana? The short answer is yes. Otherwise, how can an officer
have particularized suspicion of criminal activity? An officer that doesn’t
request to see an individual’s registry identification card before initiating
use of a drug-detection canine trained to detect marijuana is unable to deter-
mine whether the marijuana suspected to be possessed by the individual is
possessed lawfully or unlawfully.
By failing to ask Wilson and Paramore if either of them possessed
valid registry identification cards, Officer Smith lacked particularized suspi-
cion of criminal activity. Officer Smith suspected Wilson and Paramore
were trafficking drugs, but never dispelled the likelihood that the drugs he
suspected Wilson and Paramore to be trafficking were lawfully possessed
under the MMA. Even if Officer Smith had particularized suspicion that
Wilson and Paramore were in possession of marijuana, without asking them
whether they were registered cardholders, he lacked the particularized sus-
picion of criminal activity necessary to support the use of the drug-detection
canine trained to detect marijuana.
If the Montana Supreme Court re-enforces the particularized suspicion
standard to emphasize that the standard requires particularized suspicion of
criminal activity, it must consider whether a positive alert from a drug-
detection canine trained to detect marijuana gives rise to the probable cause
needed to obtain a warrant.
4. A Positive Alert is Not Probable Cause
Under Montana law, the particularized suspicion needed to use a drug-
detection canine, coupled with a subsequent positive alert from that drug-
detection canine, amounts to probable cause sufficient to issue a search war-
rant.193 In State v. Mercer,194 the officer had particularized suspicion of
criminal activity such that the canine search was lawful,195 and the positive
alert from the drug-detection canine established probable cause to issue a
193. See State v. Stoumbaugh, 157 P.3d 1137, 1143 (Mont. 2007) (positive alert from drug-detection
canine was one of many factors in determining probable cause); see e.g. State v. Mercer, 2015 WL
575994 at *4 (Mont. 2015); see also Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 247–48 (2013) (drug-detection
canine alert provides probable cause).
194. Mercer, 2015 WL 575994 at *1–4.
195. Id. at *3.
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warrant.196 There, a confidential informant indicated that Mercer used hid-
den compartments in his Lexus to transport drugs from California to Mon-
tana.197 The officer noticed modifications in Mercer’s Lexus that were con-
sistent with hidden compartments.198 Thus, the use of the drug-detection
canine was adequately supported by particularized suspicion.199 While the
facts in Mercer clearly gave rise to particularized suspicion of criminal ac-
tivity, it was the positive alert from the drug-detection canine that estab-
lished probable cause to obtain a search warrant.200
However, this presumes that the positive alert indicates presence of
illegal drugs. As discussed above, a drug-detection canine trained to alert to
the presence of marijuana is unable to distinguish between marijuana pos-
sessed in compliance with the MMA and marijuana possessed illegally.
While, in many cases, a positive alert from a drug-detection canine is just
one of many factors supporting probable cause,201 in cases like Mercer and
Wilson, which rely solely on a positive alert from a drug-detection canine to
move from particularized suspicion to probable cause, a positive alert from
a canine trained to detect marijuana is no longer a reliable indicator that the
person or place to be searched contains drugs in violation of state law.202 In
cases where the positive alert is the only factor distinguishing particularized
suspicion from probable cause, the positive alert does not give rise to proba-
ble cause, and the judge should not issue a warrant.
B. Non-judicial Alternative—the Next Generation
of Drug-detection Canines
As the old adage goes, “you can’t teach an old dog new tricks.” Due to
the difficulties in retraining drug-detection canines, law enforcement should
begin training the next generation of drug-detection canines to alert only
drugs that violate state law. In fact, some canines are trained to do just
that.203 However, most drug-detection canines currently used by state police
are trained to detect numerous drugs including marijuana.
The canine’s inability to distinguish between legally possessed mari-
juana and illegally possessed marijuana, or legally possessed marijuana and
196. Id. at *4.
197. Id. at *1.
198. Id.
199. Id. at *3.
200. Id. at *4.
201. Stoumbaugh, 157 P.3d at 1143; State v. Hart, 85 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Mont. 2004).
202. See e.g. People v. McKnight, 446 P.3d 397, 405–06 (Colo. 2019) (a positive alert from a canine
trained to detect marijuana alone will not likely establish probable cause).
203. See, e.g. People v. Bailey, 427 P.3d 821, 824 (Colo. 2018) (using a drug-detection canine
trained to detect a list of narcotics excluding marijuana was sufficient to give rise to probable cause
needed to search the vehicle).
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other illicit substances, prevents police from utilizing the canine’s ability to
detect illegal drugs.204 In a state in which possession of marijuana for medi-
cal purposes is lawful, a positive alert from a drug-detection canine trained
to detect marijuana no longer provides probable cause to justify a search,
and even if the marijuana seized is possessed unlawfully, as was the case in
Wilson, the conviction must be reversed to uphold the individual’s constitu-
tional rights. Therefore, the use of drug-detection canines trained to detect
marijuana will result in less effective enforcement of the laws that prohibit
non-cardholders from possessing marijuana. By relying on drug-detection
canines that are no longer reliable investigative tools, law enforcement may
ultimately have more convictions reversed. This applies not only to convic-
tions for marijuana possession but also for possession of methamphetamine,
cocaine, heroin, and other illegal drugs.
By refraining from using drug-detection canines trained to detect mari-
juana, it may be argued that law enforcement would not be able to enforce
laws prohibiting marijuana. However, an officer may still, without the use
of a drug-detection canine, conduct reasonable searches. An officer sus-
pecting an individual of possessing marijuana could, with probable cause
and a warrant or warrant-exception, search the individual by hand. The use
of drug-detection canines is an investigative technique which courts have
allowed based upon less than probable cause only because the canines his-
torically disclosed nothing but the presence or absence of contraband. How-
ever, in states that permit medical or adult-use marijuana, the validity of
this rationale only holds true if law enforcement uses drug-detection
canines not trained to detect marijuana.
VI. CONCLUSION
The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is a
firmly protected right, yet judicial interpretations of reasonableness reflect
changes in current legislation and more broadly society’s expectations.
While the government’s interest in promoting the health and welfare of its
citizens is best served by reasonable searches and seizures, the courts must
continue to adjust what constitutes a reasonable search in order to allow the
people to remain free from unconstitutional intrusions. This especially
holds true, as states continually relax marijuana prohibitions. If law en-
forcement does not catch up with changing ideals, it will continue to find its
attempts at drug interdiction rejected by the courts.
204. See Katz & Golembiewski, supra note 42, at 755–57.
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